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The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has a uniquely broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction that includes any “relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned” (article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights). This 
article considers the extent to which the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction includes 
international humanitarian law (IHL), and the related issue of the Court’s interpretive 
competence. It is argued that the Court is indeed competent to directly apply norms of 
IHL. However, the circumstances under which it can do so are limited to two instances: 
(i) where IHL norms are incorporated by reference into applicable human rights 
treaties; and (ii) in the likely scenario that the Court regards some IHL conventions as 
having a human rights character, the primary rules of the applicable IHL obligations 
must entail an individual right. Whether a given IHL obligation entails an individual right 
is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and in any event, such instances will be 
rare. As a consequence of the limited circumstances under which the Court can 
directly apply IHL, determining the extent to which the Court can rely on the 
interpretation of IHL in applying human rights norms remains pertinent. In this regard 
it is argued that the Court can rely on IHL in the application of human rights norms on 
two bases. First, considering the complementary relationship the Court has with the 
African Commission, the Court can rely on the African Charter’s interpretation clause 
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(articles 60 and 61). Secondly, the Court has an implied power to interpret IHL in 
applying human rights treaties, as this power is necessary for the Court to discharge 
its mandate.   
 
1. Introduction 
There is general agreement that international human rights law (IHRL) and 
international humanitarian law (IHL) co-apply during situations of armed conflict, and 
that their co-application is such that at times IHRL norms are applied in a modified 
manner so as to ensure their mutual consistency with IHL.1 A key example in this 
regard is the application of the right to life in a manner consistent with IHL-compliant 
lethal targeting during situations of armed conflict.2 Accordingly, human rights 
enforcement mechanisms, such as those forming part of the European and Inter-
American human rights systems, have recognized the need for contextual 
interpretation and application of IHRL norms, consistent with the co-application of 
IHL.3 However, as these mechanisms have a patently human rights mandate and 
usually a narrow subject-matter jurisdiction limited to their own treaty regimes, they 
have adopted different approaches in this regard. These approaches are informed by 
each mechanism’s defined competence and implied powers. In contrast to similar 
mechanisms, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court) extends to “any other human rights instrument” ratified 
by the parties before the Court.4 
 
 
1 See, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (8 July 1996) (1996) ICJ 
Reports 226 para 25. Key contributions include, N Lubell ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to 
armed conflict’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 737 738; C Droege ‘Elective affinities? 
Human rights and humanitarian law’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 501 525-527; and 
C Greenwood ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law - Conflict or Convergence’ (2010) 43 Case W. 
Res. J. Int'l L. 491 503-508. 
2 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (n 1 above) para 25. 
3 For detailed analysis for the Inter-American system see D Shelton ‘Humanitarian law in the Inter-
American Human Rights System’ in E de Wet & J Kleffner (eds) Convergence and conflicts of human 
rights and international humanitarian law in military operations (2014) 365 365-394; and for the 
European system see, K Oellers-Frahm ‘A Regional Perspective on the Convergence and Conflicts of 
human rights and international humanitarian law in military operations: The European Court of Human 
Rights’ in E de Wet & J Kleffner (eds) Convergence and conflicts of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in military operations (2014) 333 333-364. 
4 Art 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1998.  
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As the African Court is still in its formative years, many questions remain as to the 
approach it will adopt regarding its expansive subject-matter jurisdiction, including 
whether IHL conventions may be regarded as “human rights instruments”, and thus 
be open to application by the Court as part of its judicial function. Equally, the 
interpretive competence of the African Court with regard to IHL remains the subject of 
speculation and debate. These issues are of great significance, as Africa is the 
continent worst affected by armed conflict in the post-World War II era.5 Yet, the 
regulation of armed conflict in Africa, as well as the role of IHL in the African system, 
has received very little scholarly attention.6 The prevalence of armed conflict in Africa 
does not in and of itself inform the appropriateness or desirability of the African Court 
directly applying IHL instruments, but does speak to the inevitability of the Court being 
confronted with these issues. The importance of adopting a sound and consistent 
approach regarding the African Court’s mandate and interpretive competence, 
including regarding IHL, cannot be overstated, as it arises not only at the level of 
individual cases, but also with respect to the very sustainability of the Court.  
 
The core values of the African Court include ensuring “equal access to all potential 
users of the Court, [and being responsive] to the needs of those who approach the 
Court”.7 To achieve this, and indeed to achieve its mandate, the Court must ensure 
that potential litigants have appropriate guidance in determining which matters are 
properly justiciable before the Court, and have confidence in the consistency with 
which the Court will proceed in such matters. For the millions of victims of armed 
conflict on the African continent, this specifically includes clarification of the status of 
IHL under the Court’s mandate. Indeed, the African Commission on Human and 
 
5 G Waschefort ‘African and international humanitarian law: the more things change, the more they stay 
the same’ (2016) 98 International Review of the Red Cross 593 595. 
6 Waschefort has discussed IHL in an African context, (n 5 above) 593-624; Viljoen has focused on an 
institutional perspective of IHL in the African system, as well as discussing the contributions of the 
African system to the development of IHL, while Hailbronner has focused more on the normative 
dimensions to the relationship between IHL and IHRL in the context of the African system. See, F 
Viljoen ‘The relationship between international human rights and humanitarian law in the African human 
rights system: an institutional approach’ in E de Wet & J Kleffner (eds) Convergence and conflicts of 
human rights and international humanitarian law in military operations (2014) 303-332; F Viljoen 
‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and humanitarian law’ (2001) 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal 18-38; M Hailbronner ‘Laws in conflict: the relationship between 
human rights and international humanitarian law under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 339-364. 
7 https://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-us/mandate-vision-mission-values (accessed 27 
May 2020).  
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Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) failure to adequately serve the needs of victims 
of armed conflict should not be replicated by the Court.8 The Court can only achieve 
this through the development of a rigorous body of jurisprudence.  
 
The African Court finds itself at a critical juncture. The sustainability of the Court 
depends on it attracting a sufficient number of admissible cases. While 30 states have 
ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Court Protocol), 
direct access to the Court for individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
is afforded only in respect of states party who has entered an optional declaration.9 To 
date, 10 states have ever made such declarations (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Tunisia).10 However, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, have all issued notices withdrawing their 
declarations.11  More than 90% of finalized cases that were admissible were instituted 
on the basis of such direct access.12 In fact, Tanzania has been respondent in more 
than half of the Court’s finalized, admissible cases.  It appears that there has been 
some dissatisfaction along the lines that the Court is overstretching its mandate. In 
particular, Tanzania has objected to the Court exercising jurisdiction in a number of 
cases on the basis that the Court is exceeding its mandate in either acting as a court 
of first instance or an appellate court.13 While the merits of Tanzania’s objections are 
beyond the scope of the present discussion, they do indicate that states tolerance for 
perceived excesses in the Court exercising its mandate is very low. Should the Court 
regard IHL as fully justiciable, without adequate consideration of the legal-technical 
 
8 Notwithstanding the prevalence of armed conflict on the African continent, and the Commission’s 
express powers to rely on IHL in interpreting the Charter, as provided for in arts 60 & 61 of the African 
Charter, the Commission has directly relied on IHL interpretation in only one communication 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2004) AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2003). 
9 Art 5(3) read with art 36(4) Court Protocol. For ratification status, see https://www.african-
court.org/en/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration_final-May-
2020.pdf (accessed 27 May 2020). 
10 https://www.african-
court.org/en/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration_final-May-
2020.pdf (accessed 27 May 2020). 
11 Tanzania: https://twitter.com/AfrimechsHub/status/1201572103176302592; Benin: 
https://www.banouto.info/article/POLITIQUE/20200423-retrait-du-bnin-de-la-cour-africaine-les-
clarifications-du-ministre-alain-orounla/; Côte d’Ivoire: http://www.gouv.ci/_actualite-
article.php?recordID=11086; (all accessed 27 May 2020).  
12 https://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21 (accessed 27 May 2020). 
13 See, for example, Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (7 December 2018) App. No. 001/2015 para 31-34 
(Guehi case); and Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania (28 November 2019) App. No. 007/2015 para 21-31. 
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implications, the Court will likely open itself to further criticism on the basis of 
overstretching its mandate, which may result in further backlash. This concern is not 
purely theoretical, as states, particularly the United States of America, have expressed 
their dissatisfaction with UN human rights mechanisms engaging in IHL interpretation, 
precisely on the basis that these states argue IHL to be beyond the remit of the 
relevant mechanisms.14 The answer is not for the African Court to adopt a defensive 
posture, bending to the anticipated whim and will of states, but instead to recommit 
itself to rendering high quality judgments, staying within its current mandate, and 
thereby confirming its legitimacy.   
 
The African Court has the opportunity to develop a sound and consistent approach 
regarding IHL earlier in its life-cycle than its sister courts in Europe and the Americas. 
The European Court of Human Rights (European Court) and the Inter-American Court  
of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) both initially took a cautious and reluctant 
approach to their interpretative competence in relation to IHL.15 They appear to have 
avoided difficult questions regarding the impact of IHL on the application of human 
rights norms during armed conflict, rather than concluding that IHL does indeed impact 
upon the manner in which human rights are given effect to. It was only in 2014 with 
the Hassan case that the European Court for the first time truly informed its application 
of a human rights norm with reference to IHL principles.16 In stark contrast, in the wake 
of the ICJ confirming the co-application of IHL and IHRL during situations of armed 
conflict during 1996,17 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-
American Commission) begun directly applying principles of IHL.18 However, as 
Shelton submits, over time the approach of these mechanisms has somewhat 
converged – the European and Inter-American Courts have shown greater willingness 
 
14 For detailed discussion see, P Alston et al ‘The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and 
its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the ‘War on Terror’’ 19 
(2008) European Journal of International Law 183. 
15 Shelton (n 3 above) 365-394; and Oellers-Frahm (n 3 above) 333-364. 
16 Hassan v. United Kingdom ECHR (16 September 2014) App. No. 29750/09 para 76-77. 
17 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (n 1 above) para 25. 
18 Cerna identifies the impact of the 1996 ICJ finding by highlighting that during 1995 the Commission’s 
findings in regards to situations of armed conflict were silent on the applicability of IHL, whereas, by 
1997, the Commission began directly applying IHL. For example, in the Milk case, the Commission 
found a violation of common art 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See, CM Cerna ‘The History of 
the Inter-American System's Jurisprudence as Regards Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2011) 2 J. Int'l 
Human. Legal Stud. 3 31, fn 94.  
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to engage with IHL progressively, while the Inter-American Commission has restrained 
itself in this regard.19 
 
This contribution is organized into three parts. The first part considers the implications 
for the subject-matter jurisdiction and interpretive competence of the African Court, of 
provisions in human rights treaties that refers to state’s parties IHL obligations. The 
second part focuses on the interpretive competence of the African Commission and 
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Committee) in respect of IHL. The last section considers the subject-matter 
jurisdiction and interpretive competence of the African Court as far as IHL is 
concerned.  
 
2. The Legal Consequences of Reference to IHL in Human Rights 
Treaties 
It is not uncommon for human rights treaties to contain provisions that refer to IHL 
obligations. The first to have done so is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), which requires parties to respect rules of IHL relevant to the child.20 
Interestingly, the legal consequences of such references have received very little 
attention. Yet, these consequences can be very far reaching, as is illustrated by the 
African Commission’s interpretation of article 18(3) of the African Charter, which 
provides:  
 
The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure 
the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations 
and conventions. 
 
While this provision does not refer to IHL obligations, the consequences of reference 
to women and children’s rights declarations and conventions follows the same legal 
contours as reference to IHL. The Commission has interpreted article 18(3) as 
incorporating the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) by reference into the African Charter in its entirety.21 Accordingly, 
 
19 Shelton (n 3 above) 371.   
20 Art 38(1) CRC.  
21 F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 253. 
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even states party to the African Charter who are not party to CEDAW incurs the totality 
of obligations in terms of CEDAW. Moreover, they are obliged to report on the 
implementation of CEDAW to the African Commission.22 By extension of logic, it is 
reasonable to assume that a communication submitted before the Commission, based 
on an alleged violation of CEDAW, may be admissible, as it will be consistent with the 
Charter.23 This illustrates the importance of this issue for present purposes. If 
reference to IHL obligations are regarded as incorporating those obligations into a 
treaty in respect of which the African Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court 
will also have jurisdiction in respect of the referenced IHL obligations. 
 
The remainder of this section firstly considers the requirements and consequences of 
incorporation by reference in the law of treaties; secondly, the legal consequences of 
references to IHL obligations in human rights treaties; and finally, the implications for 
enforcement mechanisms.  
 
2.1 Incorporation by reference in the law of treaties  
Incorporation by refence involves reference within one legal instrument (the 
incorporating instrument) to the content of a separate, pre-existing document (the 
referenced material), with the purpose of making the referenced material part of the 
incorporating instrument, without reproducing its content.24 To those bound by the 
incorporating instrument, the source of the obligation is thus the incorporating 
instrument, not the referenced document. The doctrine of incorporation by reference 
is well-established in the common law tradition, and is used in different contexts, such 
as the law of succession, commercial contracts, and legislative enactments.25 As a 
legislative technique referential legislation is commonly used to incorporate treaties 
into domestic law. For example, article 7 of the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
Act 1967 of Australia, references and incorporates articles 1 and 22 to 24 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations into Australian law. Reference is often made in 
 
22 African Commission, Guidelines for National Periodic Reports (1989), part VII. 
23 Art 56(2) African Charter.  
24 JM Keyes Statute ‘Incorporation by Reference in Legislation’ (2004) 25(3) Statute Law Review 180; 
FS Boyd ‘Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States’ (Summer 2008) 68 Louisiana Law 
Review 1201 1210; HR Read ‘Is Referential Legislation Worth While’ (1941) Minnesota Law Review 
261 263-266. 
25 See for example, CT Carr ‘Legislation by Reference and the Technique of Amendment’ (1940) 22(1) 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 12 12-18; Keyes (n 24 above) 180.   
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legislation to external documents for purposes other than incorporating the referenced 
material, for example, informational and amendatory references.26 As such, for 
incorporation by reference to occur, the referenced material has to be both referenced 
and incorporated. No clear criteria have developed across different legal systems for 
incorporation by reference, and the issue is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
In some instances, the referenced material is very broadly defined, for example, in 
Florida state, still-in-force legislation incorporates “The common and statute laws of 
England which are of a general and not a local nature … down to the 4th day of July, 
1776…”27  In regards to the intention to incorporate, we find that sometimes implicit 
incorporation is sufficient.28 However, in such instances, the material will generally 
only be deemed incorporated if it is necessary to consult the referenced material to 
determine the meaning of the referencing legislation.29 It is submitted that the degree 
of specificity of the referenced material, and the extent to which the intention to 
incorporate is clearly articulated, are relational. That is to say, where the referenced 
material is broadly defined, the intention to incorporate will need to be expressly 
articulated, and vice versa. As far as the identification of the referenced material is 
concerned, the New South Wales courts in Australia have held: “If there is uncertainty 
as to what is the document to which the reference is made, no doubt the regulation 
would be invalid”.30  
 
The practice of incorporation by reference frequently occurs in treaty law, for example, 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) defines an “act 
of aggression” as, “the use of armed force by a State … in any … manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations”.31 No criteria for incorporation by reference 
have developed in treaty law, and this issue has received scant attention in the 
literature. However, some discussion has taken place regarding the derogation clause 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention), which 
provides:32 
 
26 Boyd (n 24 above) 1205-1210.   
27 FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (2007). 
28 See, for example, Wigram v. Fryer (1887) 36 Ch.D. 87, 56 L. J. Ch. 1098, also discussed by Read (n 
24 above) 266.  
29 Boyd (n 24 above) 1213.  
30 Wright v. T.I.L. Services Pty Ltd [1956] SR (NSW) 413 at 421.  
31 Art 8bis Rome Statute.  
32 Art 15(1) European Convention.  
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In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting 
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention … provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
 
Buergenthal has labelled the reference to “other obligations under international law”, 
as “incorporation by reference”.33 However, he argues that such obligations are limited 
to conventions to which the state is party.34 These suggestions are mutually exclusive 
– the purpose of incorporation by reference is precisely that the incorporating 
instrument becomes the source of the obligation, making it irrelevant whether states 
parties are bound by the referenced material. In contrast, Meron adopts the correct 
legal position, as his analysis is premised in the understanding that when a provision 
is properly incorporated into a treaty, states party are bound by that provision, 
regardless whether they are party to the incorporated treaty.35 Buergenthals’ use of 
“incorporation by reference” seems to be a more informal use of this terminology. In 
any event, it is clear that article 15 of the European Convention does not amount to 
an incorporation by reference, and that it is indeed limited to conventions to which the 
state is party.36  
 
In the context of treaty law, the question whether incorporation by reference has 
occurred is not simply a matter of interpretation, but is one that strikes at the heart of 
the consensual nature of treaty obligations. The recognition of legal obligations 
emanating from provisions of a treaty that is referenced, but not properly incorporated 
would conflict with the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (a treaty does not 
create obligations for third states without their consent), for states that are not party to 
the referenced treaty.37 Where a provision is properly incorporated by reference, this 
principle is not relevant, as ratification of the incorporating treaty amounts to an 
expression of consent. Even a liberal interpretation of the requirements of 
 
33 T Buergenthal ‘International and Regional Human Rights Law and Institutions: Some Examples of 
Their Interaction’ (1977) 12 Tex. Int’l L. J. 321 324 
34 Buergenthal (n 33 above) 324-325.  
35 T Meron ‘Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional 
Order’ (1982) 76 American Journal of International Law 754 764 
36 This is clear in terms of the provision’s language, referring to “its [the state’s] other obligations under 
international law”. See also, S Wallace The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights 
to Military Operations (2019) 193. 
37 Art 34 VCLT. 
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incorporation by reference will compel a conclusion that broad references to IHL, 
without identifying the relevant IHL obligations with some degree of specificity, nor 
clearly articulating an intention to incorporate, will not amount to an incorporation by 
reference. Moreover, due to their potential for constant evolution, it is doubtful that 
norms of customary international law can be incorporated by reference.  
 
Accordingly, the African Commission’s approach to the incorporation of CEDAW into 
the African Charter is not good in law.38 CEDAW is not identified with sufficient 
specificity, and the intention to incorporate is not clearly expressed. The Commission’s 
interpretation rests largely on the fact that CEDAW predates the African Charter (which 
would be required for incorporation by reference). As the CRC postdates the African 
Charter, it is not equally regarded as incorporated. However, a range of other 
international declarations, which predates the African Charter, also provides for the 
protection of the rights of women and the child, yet the Committee does not regard 
these to have been incorporated into the African Charter.39  
 
2.2 Reference and recognition of external IHL obligations  
The African Charter does not make reference to IHL at all, nor does it contain a 
derogation clause whereby IHL is referenced indirectly. However, a number of regional 
African human rights treaties does include such provisions, and they often contain 
more extensive reference to IHL than conventions at the universal level or those 
emanating from other regional systems.40 These include the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter); the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo 
Protocol); and the Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention). Each of these treaties provides that states 
party undertake to “respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian 
 
38 For an opposing view, see Viljoen (n 21 above) 253.    
39 Langley suggests that it is not only CEDAW that is incorporated, but also the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women and the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
However, this view is not consistent with the practice of the Commission. See W Langley ‘The Rights 
of Women, The African Charter, and The Economic Development of Africa’ (1987) Boston College Third 
World Law Journal 217.   
40 No convention within the European system contains direct references to IHL, and within the Inter-
American system it is only art 29 of the Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons 
of 2015 that does so. However, this convention has not generated any relevant practice. 
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law” relevant to the subject-matter of the given treaty.41 The genealogy of this provision 
is important in determining it’s consequences. As previously noted, the first expression 
of this provision came in the CRC, which provides “States Parties undertake to respect 
and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in 
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child” (own emphasis).42 The travaux 
préparatoires indicate that the words “applicable to them” was specifically inserted to 
make clear that “States are not obliged to respect ‘rules of law’ contained in treaties to 
which they are not a Party”.43 As such, the source of legal obligation remains the IHL 
conventions to which the state in question is party, and not the provision of the human 
rights treaty referencing IHL.44  
 
In all three relevant African instruments, the words “applicable to them” was omitted 
in the general obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL, raising the question 
whether the legal consequences are affected. As these provisions clearly do not 
amount to an incorporation by reference, the effect is that the source of the obligation 
remains the IHL conventions to which the state in question is party, as is the case with 
the CRC. Numerous further references to IHL are found in the African Children’s 
Charter and the Maputo Protocol. However, these provisions expressly indicate that 
the referenced IHL obligations emanate from the IHL treaties the relevant state has 
ratified.45 As such, these provisions clearly have no incorporating effect, and requires 
no further discussion.  
 
The Kampala Convention also contains a number of provisions referencing IHL, 
including the general obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL.46 Article 7 of 
the Kampala Convention is titled: “Protection and assistance to internally displaced 
persons in situations of armed conflict”. This provision applies only to armed groups, 
which are defined as “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that 
 
41 Art 22(1) African Children’s Charter; art 11(1) Maputo Protocol; and art 3(1)(e) Kampala Convention.  
42 Art 38(1) CRC.  
43 ‘Legislative history of the convention on the rights of the child, Volume II’ Office of the United Nations 
high commissioner for human rights (2007) HR/PUB/07/1 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/LegislativeHistorycrc2en.pdf Para 126 (accessed 10 
January 2020).  
44 M Drumbl & J Tobin ‘Article 38: The Rights of Children in Armed Conflict’ in J Tobin (ed) The UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Commentary (2019) 1503 1516.  
45 Arts 22(3) & 23(1) African Children’s Charter; and art 11(2) Maputo Protocol. 
46 Arts 3(1)(e), 4(4)(b) & 5(8) Kampala Convention references.  
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are distinct from the armed forces of the state”.47 Article 7(3) provides, specifically:  
“The protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under this article shall 
be governed by international law and in particular international humanitarian law”. This 
language is suggestive of an intention to incorporate IHL by reference. The provision 
prohibits members of armed groups from engaging in a closed list of nine specific 
categories of conduct against IDPs: carrying out arbitrary displacement; hampering 
protection and assistance; denying the right to live in satisfactory conditions; restricting 
freedom of movement; recruitment of children; forcible recruitment, hostage taking, 
sexual slavery and trafficking; impeding humanitarian assistance; harming 
humanitarian personnel or resources; violating the civilian and humanitarian character 
of places of shelter.48   
 
The purpose of incorporating IHL appears to be motivated by two factors. First, the 
objective of creating obligations directly for armed groups, instead of relying on the 
“respect, protect and fulfil” framework of IHRL, which traditionally requires states to be 
the conduits of obligation for non-state entities.49 Second, while the prohibited conduct 
is identified, the developed law emanating from IHL is to be applied to give substantive 
effect to the prohibitions. For example, the prohibited conduct includes: “recruiting 
children or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities under any 
circumstances”.50 The question as to the age threshold and standard of the applicable 
obligation is then to be answered, depending on the nature of the conflict, with 
reference to article 77(2) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions on to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (API), or article 4(3)(c) of 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions on to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII). Ironically, the prohibition of child use and 
recruitment contained in the African Children’s Charter provides for a higher standard 
 
47 Art 1(e) Kampala Convention. 
48 Art 7(5) Kampala Convention. 
49 In regards to the state obligation to protect human rights in relation to the actions of non-state entities, 
see N Rodley ‘Non-state actors and human rights’ in S Sheeran & N Rodley (eds) Routledge Handbook 
of International Human Rights Law (2013) 523-544. In regards to IHL creating obligation for armed 
groups, see, for example, J Kleffner ‘The applicability of the law of armed conflict and human rights law 
to organized armed groups’ in E de Wet & J Kleffner (eds) Convergence and conflicts of human rights 
and international humanitarian law in military operations (2014) 49-64; M Sassòli How does law protect 
in war? Volume (2011) 347-349.  
50 Art 7(5)(e) Kampala Convention. 
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of protection than both Protocols.51 However, the incorporation of IHL is useful in 
providing unambiguously for these obligations to apply to armed groups. In this 
instance, the intention to incorporate is clearly expressed through the words “shall be 
governed by” IHL, and the referenced material is sufficiently identified as those parts 
of IHL that regulate the nine forms of prohibited conduct.  
 
2.3 Implications for Enforcement Mechanisms  
The Kampala Convention undoubtedly falls within the jurisdiction of the African Court. 
As such, the incorporated IHL obligations will likewise fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court when the Court applies article 7 of the Kampala Convention. However, as 
proceedings cannot be instituted against armed groups before the African Court, it is 
rather unlikely that the Court will apply IHL in this context. 
 
The question remains what the legal consequences are where reference to IHL is 
made, but IHL is not incorporated. The African Children’s Committee’s first individual 
communication has bearing on this question. The Hansungule communication related 
to alleged children’s rights violations in the context of the conflict between the Ugandan 
armed forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army.52 The Committee made reference to 
IHL in its analysis of the right to education, on the basis of article 22(1) of the African 
Children’s Charter, which provides: “State Parties to this Charter shall undertake to 
respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflicts which affect the child.”53 In regards to the equivalent provision in the 
CRC, Brett suggests that “[t]he logical interpretation … is that it simply reinforces the 
obligations of states to abide by the humanitarian law by which they are already 
bound”.54 However, the Committee went further. In interpreting the right to education 
in light of applicable IHL, the Committee recognized that, “the principle of distinction 
under international humanitarian law demands that educational facilities are protected 
as long as they are civilian objects”.55 However, on the basis of available evidence the 
Committee could not “fault the margin of appreciation with which the State planned 
 
51 Art 22(2) African Children’s Charter. 
52 Communication 1/2005, Hansungule and others v. The Government of Uganda, twenty first Ordinary 
Session of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, para 5.   
53 Hansungule communication para 66.  
54 R Brett ‘Child Soldiers: Law, Politics and Practice’ (1996) 4 Int'l J. Child. Rts. 115 116. 
55 Hansungule communication para 67. 
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and conducted its military operations that could qualify as an indiscriminate attack on 
schools”.56 As such, the Committee used a rather generic reference to IHL obligations 
(contained in article 22) as a vehicle through which to engage in contextual analysis 
that considers the impact of IHL on the state in giving effect to its human rights 
obligations. 
 
Reference to IHL obligations in human rights treaties can have significant implications 
for the African Court. Where IHL obligations are both referenced and incorporated, as 
with article 7 of the Kampala Convention, the relevant IHL obligations are brought 
squarely within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, but only when applying the 
provision of the Convention containing the reference. Reference to IHL obligations, 
without incorporating these obligations, have value in acknowledging the relevance of 
IHL as well as the nexus between the observance of IHL and the enjoyment of human 
rights. Moreover, the Court can use such references as an additional basis to engage 
in a contextual interpretation of the relevant human rights norm.  
 
3. The Interpretive Competence of African Quasi-Judicial 
Mechanisms in Relation to IHL  
The Court Protocol is not a self-contained treaty, but instead, forms part of the African 
Charter regime. Moreover, the complimentary relationship that the African Court 
shares with the African Commission is confirmed in the Court Protocol.57 As a 
complimentary mechanism, the African Commission and its established practice and 
jurisprudence has bearing on an enquiry into the African Courts interpretive 
competence 
 
Interpretation clauses contributes to the institutional competence of human rights 
enforcement mechanisms, by providing for external sources upon which the 
mechanism may rely in informing its interpretation of the rights that fall within its 
jurisdiction. The African Children’s Charter’s interpretation clause, which provides for 
the interpretive competence of the African Children’s Committee, provides:58 
 
 
56 Hansungule communication para 68. 
57 Arts 2 & 8 Court Protocol.  
58 Art 46 African Children’s Charter.  
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The Committee shall draw inspiration from International Law on Human Rights, particularly from 
the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other instruments adopted by the United Nations 
and by African countries in the field of human rights, and from African values and traditions. 
 
The scope of this clause does not expressly include parts of international law other 
than “international law on human rights”. If IHL is indeed included in its scope, it then 
has to be by virtue of regarding IHL as part of “international law on human rights”. In 
the Hansungule communication the Committee premised its discussion of IHL on 
article 22, which expressly references IHL obligations, and not the interpretation 
clause.59 The Committee did reference the interpretation clause in the admissibility 
section of the finding, to justify its reliance on findings of the African Commission.60 
While not definitive, this suggests that the Committee did not regard the interpretation 
clause as also providing an authority to interpret IHL, and by extension that IHL does 
not form part of “international law on human rights” for purposes the interpretation 
clause. 
 
The interpretation clause of the African Charter is two-tiered, and provides:61  
 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights, 
particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' rights, 
the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African 
countries in the field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various 
instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties 
to the present Charter are members. 
 
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly 
recognized by member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent 
with international norms on human and people's rights, customs generally accepted as law, 
general principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
 
 
59 Hansungule communication para 66. 
60 Hansungule communication para 24. 
61 Art 60 & 61 African Charter. 
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The first tier largely mirrors the interpretation clause of the African Children’s Charter, 
and focuses specifically on “international law on human and peoples' rights”. The 
question whether the first tier implicitly includes IHL is mooted by the second tier, 
which is open-ended, and contains no limitations in regards to the subject-matter of 
the sources of law taken into consideration. IHL conventions are undoubtedly captured 
in the second tier of the interpretation clause. The two tiered approach serves an 
organizational function, distinguishing between the ability of the Commission to “draw 
inspiration from” other human rights instruments, on the one hand, and to “take into 
consideration” sources not of a human rights character, that may assist in interpreting 
relevant human rights norms.  
 
3.1 Practice of the African Commission  
The African Commission has limited practice in regards to IHL. For the most part, the 
Commission has limited itself to confirming the applicability of all Charter rights during 
situations of armed conflict.62 However, in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (DRC communication), the Commission engaged in a 
more substantive analysis of specific IHL standards for the first time.63 The DRC 
communication was an inter-state communication, relating to “grave and massive 
violations of human and peoples’ rights” committed by the armed forces of the 
respondent states on the territory of the DRC between August and November of 
1998.64 The DRC’s allegations primarily implicated the armed forces of Uganda and 
Rwanda, and alleged violations of a range of provisions of the African Charter, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, as well as API and APII.65  
 
The Commission frequently relied on the interpretation clause of the Charter both in 
regards to the admissibility of the matter, as well as the merits. The respondent states 
argued that the matter was inadmissible, as it related to alleged violations of IHL, and 
 
62 See further, Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 306-308; and Hailbronner (n 6 above) 347-
348.  
63 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2004) AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 
2003) (DRC communication). 
64 DRC communication para 3-7.  
65 DRC communication para 3-9. 
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did not fall within the mandate of the Commission. In this regard, the Commission held 
that:66  
 
The effect of the alleged activities … fall not only within the province of humanitarian law, but 
also within the mandate of the Commission. The combined effect of Articles 60 and 61 of the 
Charter compels this conclusion; and it is also buttressed by Article 23 of the African Charter. 
 
The Commission confirmed that the Geneva Conventions and API “constitute part of 
the general principles of law recognized by African States”;67 and further confirmed 
that IHL conventions “fall on all fours with the category of special international 
conventions”.68 While the Commission indicated that IHL is merely to be taken into 
consideration in the “determination” of the case,69 it engaged in detailed analysis of 
specific IHL provisions throughout the finding.  
 
The Commission’s approach has led to divergent views as to whether it went beyond 
its authority to consider IHL conventions as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law. Viljoen has argued that the Commission appropriately sought 
interpretive guidance from IHL, in finding violations of human rights law.70 IHL 
provisions were used to give “concrete content to the rather abstract notions” of some 
features of the African Charter, for example, in the context of the Commission’s 
analysis of the dumping of bodies and mass burials.71 He highlighted that the 
Commission confirmed “a definite dividing line between the ‘province’ of IHL, on the 
one hand, and the human rights ‘mandate’ of the Commission”,72 on the other, 
suggesting IHL conventions do not form part of “international law on human and 
peoples' rights”.73 Accordingly, he concluded that the Commission held that it is not 
empowered to find violations of IHL, but it is empowered to rely on IHL in interpreting 
the rights within its subject-matter jurisdiction.74 Hailbronner disputes this conclusion 
– she focuses strongly on the Commission’s detailed analysis of IHL, which at times 
 
66 DRC communication para 64. 
67 DRC communication para 70. 
68 DRC communication para 78. 
69 DRC communication para 70. 
70 Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 314.  
71 Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 317.  
72 Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 308.  
73 This conclusion is also supported by Hailbronner (n 6 above) 346. 
74 Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 308.  
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is done without reference to rights contained in the African Charter.75 For example, the 
Commission found that taking article 56 of API and article 23 of Hague Convention (II) 
into account, as read with the African Charter’s interpretation clause (articles 60 and 
61), that the besiegement of a hydroelectric dam in Lower Congo province, amounts 
to a violation of the African Charter.76 However, the Commission does state in a later 
paragraph that the besiegement of the dam amounts to a violation of the right to 
property under the African Charter.77 Hailbronner argues that during its analysis, the 
Commission ocellated between applying IHL directly, and merely relying on IHL for 
interpretive purposes.78 She expressly disputes Viljoen’s conclusion that “‘the African 
Commission has found only violations of human rights law, but in so doing, has sought 
interpretive guidance from international humanitarian law”.79 
 
The Commission limited its finding to violations of the African Charter.80 Viljoen is 
correct in concluding that the direct application of IHL does not fall within the mandate 
of the Commission. Hailbronner exaggerates the implications of the Commission’s 
detailed interpretation of IHL – regardless of the extent of discussion of IHL, the 
Commission did not purport to find a violation of IHL. However, her critique of the 
Commission for poorly articulating its reasoning is well founded. Both Viljoen and 
Hailbronner suggested that the Commission’s analysis of the besiegement of the dam 
links article 56 of API and/or article 23 of Hague Convention (II) to article 23 of the 
African Charter (providing for “the right to national and international peace and 
security”).81  
 
This erroneous interpretation is based on the Commission stating, “the Respondent 
States are in violation of the Charter with regard to the just noted article 23”.82 The 
“just noted article 23” refers to article 23 of the Hague Convention II, and not article 23 
 
75 Hailbronner (n 6 above) 350-352. 
76 DRC communication para 83-84. It is interesting to note that the Commission did not explicitly address 
the status of the Hague Convention (II) under art 61 of the Charter, as it did in regards to the Geneva 
Conventions and Optional Protocols. 
77 Art 14 African Charter, DRC communication para 88. 
78 Hailbronner (n 6 above) 349. 
79 Viljoen ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 314, quoted in Hailbronner (n 6 above) 350  
80 DRC communication operative paragraph. The Commission found violations of arts 2, 4, 5, 12(1) and 
(2), 14, 16, 17, 18(1) and (3), 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the African Charter. 
81 Hailbronner (n 6 above); 350 Viljoen  ‘an institutional approach’ (n 6 above) 316 
82 DRC communication para 80.  
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of the Charter. Indeed, article 23 of Hague Convention II was discussed just prior to 
the sentence containing the words “just noted”. This leaves open the question as to 
which provision of the Charter the respondent states had violated in regards to the 
besiegement of the dam. The subsequent paragraph of the finding cites the Celebici 
case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as “supportive of 
the Commission’s stance”.83 The relevant paragraph of the Celebici case upon which 
the Commission relied relates to the obligation of parties to conflict in relation to the 
private and public property of an opposing party, and specifically provides that “private 
property must be respected and cannot be confiscated...pillage is formally 
forbidden”.84 This suggests that the Commission linked article 14, the right to property, 
to the besiegement of the dam.85  
 
This aspect of the Commission’s finding is awkwardly drafted, leading to ambiguity, 
but from an IHL perspective, this issue is important to address. Both articles 56 of API 
and 23 of Hague Convention (II) are quintessential IHL provisions. IHL is premised on 
the equality of belligerents, and thus operates without distinction as to wrongfulness 
in engaging in armed conflict. Along these contours, Schabas has noted that the 
difficulty with reconciling IHRL and IHL lies with:  
 
…the failure to grasp an underlying distinction: international humanitarian law 
is built upon neutrality or indifference as to the legality of the war itself. Human 
rights law, on the other hand, views war itself as a violation. There is a human 
right to peace. Because of this fundamental incompatibility of perspective with 
regard to jus ad bellum, human rights law and international humanitarian law 
can only be reconciled … if human rights law abandons the right to peace and 
develops an indifference to the jus ad bellum.86 
 
The existence of an international armed conflict (IAC) in the DRC at the time is a 
precondition to the application of API and Hague Convention (II) to the besiegement 
 
83 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al (16 November 1998) ICTY-IT-96-21-T (Celebici case) cited in DRC 
communication para 85. 
84 Celebici case para 587, cited in DRC communication para 85. 
85 See also, DRC communication para 88. 
86 WA Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 603. 
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of the dam. Moreover, “the legality of the war itself” is irrelevant in determining the 
lawfulness of the besiegement of the dam under IHL. In contrast, the wrongfulness of 
the respondent states engaging in an armed conflict in the DRC, is central in 
determining a violation of the right to international peace and security. The 
Commission did find a violation of article 23 of the African Charter, but this aspect to 
the analysis is dealt with separately to the issue of the besiegement of the dam. 
Moreover, the Commission’s analysis and application of the right to national and 
international peace and security is done with direct reference to the prohibition on the 
use of force, and the associated UN Charter use of force regime. Therefore, 
suggesting that article 23 of the African Charter can be interpreted and applied in light 
of the referenced IHL provisions is non-sensical, and not supported by the finding of 
the Commission. 
  
The African Charter’s interpretation clause affords the Commission the interpretive 
competence to refer to IHL extensively, but no mandate to apply IHL directly. The 
scope of articles 60 and 61 may have consequences for the African Court. This will be 
further discussed below.   
 
4. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
There are three avenues through which the African Court can engage with IHL: 1) 
through reference to IHL in the substantive norms of relevant human rights treaties; 2) 
by way of its subject-matter jurisdiction; and 3) through its interpretive competence.  
 
With regard to the first category, it is important to recall that, where there is a proper 
incorporation by reference of IHL obligations into a human rights treaty in respect of 
which the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court will have 
jurisdiction in respect of the incorporated IHL obligations. On the other hand, reference 
to IHL obligations which are not incorporated, serves to acknowledge the relevance of 
IHL to the rights under discussion, as well as the nexus between the observance of 
IHL and the enjoyment of human rights, and provides a basis upon which to engage 
in contextual analysis that considers the impact of IHL on the state in giving effect to 
its human rights obligations. However, as the above discussion of ‘reference to IHL in 
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human rights treaties’ specifically considered the African Court, there is no need for 
further consideration here. 
 
In contrast to other human rights enforcement mechanisms, the African Court is 
endowed with a uniquely broad subject-matter jurisdiction, which extends to “all cases 
and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
States concerned”.87 Subject-matter jurisdiction determines which legal norms a given 
mechanism is empowered to apply as part of its judicial function. Whereas, the 
interpretive competence of a mechanism speaks to its competence to use sources not 
within its subject-matter jurisdiction to aid in giving meaning to the legal norms that are 
within its subject-matter jurisdiction. This section will consider the extent to which the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court includes IHL; and thereafter, the interpretive 
competence of the Court with respect to IHL.  
 
4.1 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Upon adoption of the Protocol leading commentators were divided on the question 
whether the subject-matter jurisdiction of the African Court should be interpreted 
broadly, or more restrictively. At one end of the spectrum, the apparent breadth of 
subject-matter jurisdiction was hailed, and it was argued that the only real restriction 
would be that the instrument in question be ratified by the parties before the Court.88 
On the other end of the spectrum, concern was expressed regarding the implications 
of such broad subject-matter jurisdiction.89 To mitigate these implications, it was 
argued, the African Court should interpret restrictively what are “relevant” treaties, so 
as to limit the Court to African regional human rights treaties,90 or even more 
 
87 Art 3(1) Court Protocol. 
88 See, amongst others, M Mutua ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 
Hum. Rts. Q. 342 354; J Mubangizi & A O’Shea ‘An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’’ 
(1999) 24 South African Yearbook of International Law 256 268; GJ Naldi & K Magliveras ‘Reinforcing 
the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the establishment of a regional court of human 
and peoples’ rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 431. 
89 C Heyns ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ (2001) 2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 155 165-171; MJ Mujuzi ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and Its 
Protection of the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2017) 16(2) Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 
(2017) (2017) 186 193.  
90 F Viljoen (n 21 above) 435-436; Heyns (n 89 above) 165-171. 
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restrictively, to treaties “that make express provision for adjudication by the … 
Court”.91  
 
It is clear that only treaties that are ratified by the states concerned fall within article 3. 
However, the Court has made some questionable assertations regarding the status of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) of 1948. In its 
analysis in Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania the Court acknowledged that the 
Universal Declaration is regarded as forming part of customary international law.92 
However, in the operative part of the judgment, the Court ultimately found a violation 
of the right to nationality under article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration, without 
referencing either customary international law, or a Charter provision.93 More recently, 
in Robert John Penessis v. Tanzania, the Court again considered article 15(2) of the 
Universal Declaration. While the Court restated that the Universal Declaration forms 
part of customary international law, it considered the right to nationality in the Universal 
Declaration in light of article 5 of the African Charter.94 The Court ultimately found a 
violation of the right to nationality “as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Charter and Article 
15 of the UDHR”.95 More recently, the Court found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
in regards to an alleged violation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen of 1789, as this declaration is not a human rights instrument open to 
ratification by states.96 Finally, the African Court has not directly addressed the issue 
as to the meaning and importance of the word “relevant” in article 3. Its practice 
indicates that ‘relevant’ simply relates to whether the substance of the treaty reflects 
the violations of rights alleged in a given matter. The Court has, for example, 
consistently exercised subject-matter jurisdiction in respect of the ICCPR.  
 
4.1.1 The Nature and Character of “Human Rights Instruments” under the Court 
Protocol  
 
91 Heyns (n 89 above) 168. 
92 Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania (22 March 2018) App. No. 012/2015 para 132(v). 
93 Anudo case para 76. 
94 Robert John Penessis v. Tanzania (28 November 2019) App. No. 013/2015 paras 85 & 103.  
95 Penessis case para 168(v). 
96 Sebastien Germain Ajavon v. Benin (28 March 2019) App. No 013/2017 at para 45. 
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The legal consequences of a breach of a norm of international law is determined by 
the primary rule of the norm.97 For present purposes, we can distinguish between: 1) 
norms of which the primary rule entails human rights for individuals; 2) norms of which 
the primary rule entails individual rights not of a human rights character; and 3) norms 
of which the primary rules do not entail individual rights, but only state responsibility. 
The Court Protocol does not alter the nature of primary rules contained in third treaties, 
for example, IHL treaties. The consensual nature of treaty obligations dictates that 
states are only bound by the scope and content of norms to which they agreed. As 
such, regardless of how broad the Court Protocol purports to frame the Court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court cannot apply norms the primary rules of which do 
not entail individual rights. However, where a norm does indeed provide for individual 
rights, the Court has a margin of discretion as to how broad it interprets whether these 
rights amount to “human rights”. 
 
In the matter of APDH v Côte d'Ivoire (APDH case),  the Court first engaged directly 
with questions as to whether a particular treaty or treaty provision qualifies as a 
“human rights treaty”.98 The APDH, an Ivorian NGO, alleged that structural changes 
to the Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) were inconsistent with the 
requirements of independence and impartiality as provided for in the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Charter on Democracy) and the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (ECOWAS Protocol).99 In 
considering whether these instruments are included in the scope of article 3 of the 
Court Protocol, the Court held that:100 
 
… in determining whether a convention is a human rights instrument, it is necessary to refer in 
particular to the purposes of such convention. Such purposes are reflected either by an express 
enunciation of the subjective rights of individuals or groups of individuals, or by mandatory 
obligations on State Parties for the consequent enjoyment of the said rights.  
 
 
97 Art 33(2) Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (2001) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two 95, para 
4.  
98 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme v. Côte d'Ivoire (18 November 2016) App. No. 
001/2014. 
99 APDH case para 3 & 20.  
100 APDH case para 57. 
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This formulation suggests that the determinative factor is the “purposes” of the treaty. 
These purposes are to be determined on the basis of expressly enunciated rights, or 
mandatory obligations resulting in the enjoyment of such rights. There is debate as to 
whether the human rights character of an instrument is to be determined by the 
instrument holistically, or in relation to a given provision.101 The emphasis on the 
purposes of the instrument suggests that the focus is not on individual norms, but on 
the holistic character of the instrument. Nevertheless, the use of the plural suggests 
that the instrument can have more than one purpose.  
 
The Court illustrates what it means with the “express enunciation of the subjective 
rights”, as well as, “mandatory obligations” for the enjoyment of rights, by reference to 
articles 13 and 26 of the African Charter, respectively, not by reference to either 
instrument under consideration.102 Article 13(1) provides “every citizen shall have the 
right to participate freely in the government of his country…”, and article 26 provides, 
“states parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the 
independence of the Courts…”. Curiously, the Court never identifies either a provision 
that enunciates specific rights, or creates mandatory obligations for the consequent 
enjoyment of rights, in either treaty. 
 
Express enunciation of subjective rights of individuals  
To date the only matter in which the Court was confronted with the question whether 
a norm that enunciates a subjective right amount to a human right, is that of Armand 
Guehi v Tanzania (Guehi). The material facts of this case related to the conviction and 
capital sentence of an Ivorian national in Tanzania for the murder of his wife. The 
alleged violations related to fair trial rights, the right to property, treatment in detention 
and the failure to provide consular assistance.103 In regards to the alleged failure to 
provide consular assistance, the applicant relied upon article 36(1)(b) and (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), which relates to the facilitation of 
“the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State”.104 In 
 
101 See, Viljoen (n 21 above) 437; and A Rachovitsa ‘On New ‘Judicial Animals’: The Curious Case of 
an African Court with Material Jurisdiction of a Global Scope’ (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 255 
262. 
102 APDH case para 59-60. 
103 Guehi case para 9. 
104 Guehi case para 35. 
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particular, it provides that the authorities of the arresting state will “inform the person 
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph”.105  
 
The ICJ had twice previously been called upon to determine whether article 36(1) of 
the VCCR amounts to a human right, and both these matters related to capital 
sentences in relation to foreign nationals. In Le Grand, the ICJ held that article 36(1) 
provides for obligations owed by the receiving state both to the individual as well as 
the sending state.106 The ICJ characterized the obligations owed to the individual as 
“individual rights”, a violation of these rights were found to have occurred, and on this 
basis the ICJ held it not necessary to determine whether these individual rights amount 
to human rights.107 In the Avena case, Mexico argued that article 36(1) amounts to a 
human right, and that as such, this right should be guaranteed in the territory of all 
states party, and that this right “is so fundamental that its infringement will ipso facto 
produce the effect of vitiating the entire process of the criminal proceedings conducted 
in violation of this fundamental right”.108 The ICJ held that:109  
 
Whether or not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that this Court 
need decide. The Court would, however, observe that neither the text nor the object and 
purpose of the Convention, nor any indication in the travaux préparatoires, support the 
conclusion that Mexico draws from its contention in that regard. 
  
Some commentators have concluded that the ICJ found, at least in obiter dictum, that 
the individual rights espoused in article 36(1) are not human rights.110 However, this 
interpretation is not supported by the judgment. The Court expressly held that it need 
not decide on the human rights character of article 36(1). The Court’s refence to 
Mexico’s conclusions not being supported by the text and travaux préparatoires 
appear to relate more to the contention regarding the effect of violating the right to 
consular access and assistance, than to characterizing the said right as a human right. 
Significantly, the Court focused its analysis on whether article 36(1) of the VCCR 
 
105 Arts 36(1)(b) & (c) VCCR.  
106 LeGrand (Germany v. United States of America) (27 June 2001) (2001) ICJ Reports 466 para 77. 
107 LeGrand case para 78. 
108 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (31 March 2004) (2004) 
ICJ Reports 2004 12 para 124. 
109 Avena case para 124. 
110 Rachovitsa (n 101 above) 265.  
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provides individual rights, and not whether the VCCR, as a convention, is a human 
rights treaty.  
 
Unfortunately, in the Guehi case the African Court never analyzed, nor answered, the 
question whether article 36(1) of the VCCR amounts to a human rights treaty for 
purposes of article 3 and 7 of the Court Protocol. While the Court recognized that the 
Applicant claimed that the lack of consular assistance “deprived him of the possibility 
to enjoy assistance from his country with respect to the protection of his fair trial 
rights”,111 it did not recognize a right to consular assistance, as such. Instead, the 
Court determined that consular assistance “touches on certain privileges whose 
purpose is to facilitate the enjoyment by individuals of their fair trial rights”, and 
determined that article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter, read with article 14 of the ICCPR, 
also guarantee the rights under article 36(1) of the VCCR.112 This is a spurious claim, 
given that neither the African Charter nor the ICCPR affords a right to consular 
assistance. Ultimately, the Court found that it had subject-matter “jurisdiction to 
examine the Applicant's allegation based on the above-mentioned provision of the 
[African] Charter”. The Court’s finding on the merits likewise proceeds on the basis 
that article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter encapsulates the allegations made on the 
basis of the VCCR, and the Court thus only applied the African Charter.  
 
Mandatory obligations for the enjoyment of rights 
In the APDH case the Court concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction in relation 
to the African Democracy Charter and the ECOWAS Protocol, as the relevant 
obligations of these treaties are “aimed at implementing the rights prescribed by article 
13 of the African Charter”.113 Moreover, it found violations of both treaties. The 
reasoning that a given treaty is aimed at implementing the rights contained in a third 
treaty, and as a result is brought within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, is 
not expressly captured in the Court’s framework on mandatory obligations, as set out 
above. Moreover, it is questionable whether the purposes of a treaty can be 
determined by rights contained in a third treaty. It is striking that the Court never 
considered any provision from either the African Charter on Democracy, nor the 
 
111 Guehi case para 95. 
112 Guehi case para 37-38. 
113 APDH case para 63. 
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ECOWAS Protocol, in analysing its subject-matter jurisdiction. It also never clearly 
links either the enunciation of specific rights, or mandatory obligations on state parties 
with the enjoyment of rights. The Court’s judgment leaves open the question whether 
the primary rules of the relevant provisions of either the African Democracy Charter or 
the ECOWAS Protocol provide for individual rights.  
 
In support of its position that the relevant treaties are included in the scope of article 
3, as they provide for obligations for the consequent enjoyment of rights, the Court 
relied on the European Court’s judgment in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium 
(Mathieu-Mohin).114 In Mathieu-Mohin it was alleged that Belgium was acting in 
violation of article 3 of Protocol I to European Convention, which provides “The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections…”. The European Court 
dismissed an argument that article 3 does not create individual rights, but merely state 
obligations, on the basis that the preamble to the Protocol ensures "the collective 
enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in 
Section I of the Convention"; and the fact that the Protocol explicitly provides that 
articles 1-4 “shall be regarded as additional Articles to the Convention and all the 
provisions of the Convention shall apply accordingly”.115 What the African Court failed 
to appreciate is that there is a material distinction between a given obligation simply 
resulting in the factual better enjoyment of individual rights; and an obligation the 
primary rule of which provides for an individual right. In Mathieu-Mohin the European 
Court expressly confirmed that the relevant provision fell within the latter category. In 
APDH this was not considered at all.116 Therefore, a treaty provision does not have to 
expressly enunciate rights to entail individual rights. However, it is not enough that it 
merely provides for obligations that result in the better enjoyment of rights factually. 
The primary rules of these obligations must include legal entitlements for the 
individual, as was the case in Mathieu-Mohin. 
 
There is a severe lack of rigor and specificity in the African Courts jurisprudence 
regarding its subject-matter jurisdiction to date – the Court has failed to develop a 
systematic approach or framework to be applied to determine whether a given treaty 
 
114 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium ECHR (2 March 1987) Series A 113, para 46-51. 
115 Art 5 Protocol 1 European Convention.  
116 See further, Rachovitsa (n 101 above) 262-262. 
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provision falls within its jurisdiction. The existing jurisprudence allows few definitive 
conclusions to be reached. The conclusions that can be reached, includes, the 
inclusion of UN human rights treaties and treaties of RECs as “relevant” human rights 
treaties; and that “human rights instrument” includes not only treaties that enunciate 
rights, but also those that create mandatory state obligations for the consequent 
enjoyment of rights. However, the Court should clarify at the earliest opportunity that, 
it is not the form of expression that determines whether the norm presents an individual 
right, but instead, it is the primary rule of the specific norm that is determinative. 
Additionally, the circumstances in which a norm that is expressed as a mandatory 
obligation for the consequent enjoyment of a right, does indeed amount to an individual 
right, is rare. Finally, it is not sufficient that a norm contained in a treaty provides for 
an individual right, but the purposes of the treaty is determinative as to whether it falls 
within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The focus of the enquiry will now shift to 
consider whether IHL conventions may be regarded as “human rights instruments” for 
purposes of articles 3 and 7.  
 
4.1.2 IHL conventions as “relevant human rights instruments”  
Provost calls for an “interpretation of humanitarian law norms as standards of 
treatment or conduct rather than as rights of protected persons”.117 Sassòli et al 
confirms that in regards to IHL, “the majority view, is that, the State responsible for the 
violation has to compensate the State injured by the violation; it does not confer a right 
to compensation on the individual victims of violations”.118 The traditional approach 
suggests that, while individuals are the beneficiaries of many IHL provisions, they do 
not have associated individual rights. Instead, these obligations, and the concomitant 
legal entitlements, are owed inter partes. This traditional approach would then imply 
that IHL obligations cannot fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the African 
Court, as their primary rules do not entail individual rights. However, there is growing 
support for the idea that some IHL obligation do indeed confer individual rights.119  
 
 
117 R Provost International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002) 28-30. 
118 M Sassòli (n 49 above) 387. 
119 See for example, T Meron ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94(2) American Journal 
of International Law 239 275. 
Pre-publication version. Forthcoming in African Human Rights Law Journal 20(1) 2020 
 29 
The dissenting and sperate opinions of Judges Koroma and Cançado Trindade, 
respectively, in the Jurisdictional Immunities case of the ICJ, illustrates well the depth 
of disagreement on this issue. Judge Cançado Trindade opined, that both article 3 of 
Hague Convention (IV) as well as article 91 of API “confer the right to reparation at 
international level to victims of those grave breaches”;120 while Judge Koroma is of the 
view that nothing in either convention supports this proposition.121 On the municipal 
plane, the courts of the Netherlands and Greece recognize individual rights conferred 
by IHL, yet, the courts of Japan and the United States studiously rejects such 
claims.122 
 
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) commentaries to the Draft articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 (Draft Articles), 
recognizes that “an internationally wrongful act may involve legal consequences in the 
relations between the State responsible for that act and persons or entities other than 
States”.123 Moreover, the ILC commentary clarifies that the question whether persons 
or non-state entities are entitled to invoke responsibility on their own account, will be 
determined by the particular primary rule.124 In reference to the Draft Articles and ILC 
commentaries, Sassòli concludes that individuals are beneficiaries of IHL obligations. 
Moreover, as a matter of substantive law, some provisions of conventional IHL affords 
individual victims a legal entitlement.125 He suggests that the problem in giving effect 
to these legal entitlements is mostly procedural, as individuals do not have standing 
to access traditional implementation machinery. This approach is also reflected in the 
International Law Association’s Declaration of International Law Principles on 
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict of 2010.  
 
The ICC recently held that IHL does not recognize a “general rule excluding members 
of armed forces from protection against violations by members of the same armed 
 
120 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) (3 February 2012) 
(2012) ICJ Reports 99, dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para 70. 
121 Jurisdictional Immunities case (n 120 above), separate opinion of Judge Koroma, para 9. 
122 For further discussion, see L Hill-Cawthorne ‘Rights under International Humanitarian Law’ (2018) 
28(4) European Journal of International Law 1187 1206-1207.  
123 Art 28 Commentaries to the Draft Articles (n 97 above) 87-88, para 3. 
124 Art 33(2) Commentaries to the Draft Articles (n 97 above) 95, para 4.  
125 M Sassòli ‘State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law’ (2002) 84 International 
Review of the Red Cross 401 418-419.  
Pre-publication version. Forthcoming in African Human Rights Law Journal 20(1) 2020 
 30 
force”.126 The notion of own force violations is incompatible with a framework premised 
solely on obligations owed inter partes – state responsibility is premised on injury 
caused to the state towards whom an obligation is owed as a result of an 
internationally wrongful act. Surely an adversarial party is not injured as a result of 
own force violations. While this issue has generated much debate, there is growing 
recognition of own force violations in IHL.127 This would not be possible, if one adheres 
strictly to the traditional conception of IHL.  
 
The traditional perspective of IHL rests on attributing certain characteristics to IHL, as 
a regime. For example, according to Hill-Cawthorne whether one adheres to the 
traditional perspective, or instead recognizes the individual rights perspective, rests 
on differences of opinion regarding the raison d’être of IHL.128 In contrast, Sassòli 
takes a more measured approach, in determining that whether or not a given norm 
present standards of treatment of which individuals are both beneficiaries and rights 
holders, is not dependent on overarching characteristics of IHL, but instead the legal 
character of the individual norm in question.129  
 
It is clear that there is significant support for the view that the primary rules of some 
norms of conventional IHL does indeed provide for individual rights. However, as 
Sassòli suggests, this determination is to be made with reference to the specific norm 
in question.130 The existence of individual rights in IHL does not necessarily imply that 
these are human rights. Moreover, as the Court held in APDH, the purposes of the 
convention should be determinative – this can be read, in more traditional international 
law language, as the object and purpose of the treaty. The Court will thus have to clear 
two hurdles in order to regard specific IHL norms as forming part of its subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Firstly, it will have to determine that the object and purpose of the relevant 
IHL treaties include the advancement of human rights. Secondly, it will have to 
 
126 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Ntaganda against the “Second 
decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9” No. 
ICC-01/04-02/06 OA5 (15 June 2017) para 63-64. 
127 See, for example, J Kleffner ‘Friend or foe? On the protective reach of the law of armed conflict’ in 
M Matthee et al (eds) Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search of the Human Face (2013) 285-
302; PV Sellers ‘Ntaganda: Re-Alignment of a Paradigm’ (2018) International Institute of Humanitarian 
Law. 
128 Hill-Cawthorne (n 122 above) 1191-1195. 
129 Sassòli (n 125 above) 418-419. 
130 Sassòli (n 125 above) 418-419. 
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determine that the primary rules of the individual IHL norms it seeks to apply does in 
fact entail an individual right. To do so, the Court cannot adopt the traditional approach 
to IHL, as discussed above. Given its finding APDH, it is likely that the Court will regard 
the object and purpose of IHL obligations, particularly those relevant to the protection 
of victims of armed conflict (the law of Geneva), to include the advancement of human 
rights. However, even the most arduous supporter of the existence of individual rights 
in IHL would agree that the number of such IHL obligations is extremely limited. The 
Court can thus properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a limited number of 
IHL obligations.  
 
4.2 Competence of the African Court to interpret IHL 
The conclusions reached above that the African Court has a narrow potential to apply 
IHL as part of its subject-matter jurisdiction, has the implication that a need remains 
for the Court to be able to have recourse to IHL more broadly in the interpretation and 
application of human rights norms. Also, often IHL interpretation will have bearing on 
the application of a human rights obligation, without IHL being directly applied.  
 
Article 7 of the Court Protocol is titled “sources of law”, and provides the Court “…shall 
apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments 
ratified by the States concerned”. In distinction, article 3 is titled “jurisdiction” and 
provides “the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted 
to it concerning the interpretation and application of … any other relevant Human 
Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned”. Deeming article 7 to be an 
interpretation clause, as most commentators do, leads to the absurd conclusion that 
the interpretation clause is superfluous, as the Court is mandated to directly apply 
each of the sources included in the presumed interpretation clause. Moreover, the lack 
of power on the part of the Court to interpret sources other than “relevant human rights 
instruments” may detrimentally act as an incentive to interpret more expansively 
exactly what such relevant instruments are.131   
 
131 The Court’s conclusion that the treaties under consideration in the APDH case were included in the 
meaning of art 3, was based on tenuous reasoning. Throughout the Court’s analysis, the relevant 
obligations are used as a basis to interpret the right to political participation in terms of art 13 of the 
African Charter. This approach is more reminiscent of drawing inspiration from a source of law in terms 
of an interpretation clause or implied powers, than applying a treaty. As such, had this option been 
available to the Court more expressly, it may rather have relied on these treaties for interpretation.  
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The principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation provides that “interpretation must 
give meaning and effect to all terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a 
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses … to redundancy or inutility”.132 
The only reading that gives effect to both provisions, without rendering one redundant, 
is that article 7 is in fact not an interpretation clause. Articles 3 and 7 define separate, 
but closely related matters: article 3 does not state explicitly which legal sources the 
Court is empowered to apply, but instead defines the nature of “cases and disputes” 
that falls within the Court’s jurisdiction. In contrast, article 7 states explicitly which legal 
sources the Court “shall apply” – indeed, such use of peremptory language makes it 
abundantly clear that article 7 is not an interpretation clause.  
 
If the Court Protocol is silent on interpretation, as I conclude, two possibilities remain 
upon which the Court may legitimately draw on IHL in discharging its mandate to apply 
human rights norms. First, interpretive competence can potentially be sourced 
externally. Secondly, interpretive competence may form part of the implied powers of 
the institution.  
 
4.2.1 Interpretive competence founded on external sources  
Stemmet suggested that as article 7 of the Court Protocol empowers the Court to apply 
the provisions of the African Charter, the Court is entitled to apply articles 60 and 61 
of the Charter (interpretation clause, discussed above) in determining its interpretive 
competence.133 On the other hand, Heyns argued that articles 60 and 61 of the African 
Charter defines only the interpretive competence of the Commission.134 A purely 
textual interpretation of the African Charter compels a conclusion that articles 60 and 
61 applies only to the Commission. However, the Court and Commission exists within 
the same treaty regime – indeed, the Court Protocol is a Protocol to the African 
Charter, and the Court “complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission … conferred upon it by the African Charter”.135 This complementary 
 
132 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (29 April 1996) AB-1996-1 
WTO Appellate Body 23.  
133 A Stemmet ‘A Future African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights and Domestic Human Rights 
Norms’ (1998) 23 South African Yearbook of International Law 233 239. Hailbronner has made 
substantially the same argument (n 6 above) 353. 
134 Heyns (n 89 above) 169. 
135 Art 2 Court Protocol.   
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relationship is reaffirmed in article 8 of the Court Protocol, providing for the 
consideration of cases. Moreover, beyond conceptual complementarity, there exists 
significant mechanical integration between the Court and Commission. For instance, 
the Court Protocol incorporates by reference the admissibility criteria applicable to the 
Commission, and provides that the Court may request the opinion of the Commission 
as to whether a given matter is admissible before the Court.136 A situation in terms of 
which the African Court and Commission cannot rely on the same tools in their 
interpretation and application of the African Charter enhances the risk for institutional 
fragmentation, and stands at odds with the notion of a harmonized treaty regime. As 
such, a teleological interpretation suggests that articles 60 and 61 indeed also applies 
to the Court. This raises the question whether the Court can only rely on articles 60 
and 61 when applying the Charter, or will it also be able to do so when applying other 
conventions within its jurisdiction?   
 
As mentioned above, interpretation clauses by nature are constitutional, not 
legislative. They define part of the institutional competence of a mechanism, and do 
not contribute normatively to the relevant convention. The implication being, the 
Commission is empowered to draw on the sources listed in articles 60 and 61, whether 
it is applying the Charter or any other convention within its subject matter jurisdiction, 
such as the Maputo Protocol. Yet, other mechanisms that may apply the Charter as 
part of their jurisdiction, such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice, cannot rely on articles 60 and 61 to inform 
their interpretive competence.137 Instead, such mechanism’s jurisdiction and 
interpretive competence is to be determined by their constitutive treaty. The 
conclusion that articles 60 and 61 apply also to the Court, does not change the nature 
of these provisions as constitutional. Therefore, they contribute to the institutional 
competence of the Court to rely on the listed sources, regardless of whether it is 
applying the Charter, or any other convention.  
 
 
136 Art 6 Court Protocol. 
137 For the jurisdiction and competence of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, see Protocol 
A/P.l/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice, as amended by Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 
on the Community Court of Justice.  
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Starting with its first judgment on the merits, the Court endorsed this interpretation. 
Relying on the Charter’s interpretation clause, the Court held that the ICCPR is an 
“instrument adopted by the United Nations on human and peoples’ rights”, and as 
such, the Court can “draw inspiration” from it in its interpretation of the Charter.138 
 
4.2.2 Implied interpretive competence  
The European Convention does not contain an interpretation clause, yet the Court has 
maintained that it “never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole 
framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined 
therein”.139 While the Court has often rendered judgments related to human rights 
violations during situations of armed conflict, for a long time it showed reluctance to 
interpret IHL in a manner that would impact on how it applies European Convention 
rights. However, in the Hassan case, the European Court had to determine whether 
the capture and subsequent detention of the applicant’s brother by British forces in 
Iraq, was contrary to article 5 of the European Convention. Article 5 provides for a 
closed list of exceptions to the general prohibition of the deprivation of liberty. While it 
was common cause that the basis for detention was security, such security detention 
is not included within the listed exceptions to article 5. The United Kingdom argued 
that that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction during the “active hostilities phase 
of an international armed conflict”, as the State’s conduct is regulated by IHL instead 
of the European Convention.140 The Court rejected this argument, confirming that “the 
Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and should so far as possible be 
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part”.141 
Ultimately, the Court found no violation of article 5 on the basis that the grounds for 
deprivation of liberty under article 5 should accommodate security detention as 
provided for in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.142  
 
The European Court’s power to interpret IHL in the absence of an express 
authorization is an implied power. In the Reparations for Injuries opinion, the ICJ held:  
 
138 Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania (14 June 2013) App. No. 009/2011 & 011/2011 (consolidated) 
para 107. For a more recent endorsement of this interpretation, see Frank David Omary and Others v. 
Tanzania (28 March 2014) App. No. 001/2012 para 73. 
139 Demir and Baykara v.Turkey ECHR (12 November 2008) App. No.34503/97 para 67. 
140 Hassan case para 76. 
141 Hassan case para 77. 
142 Hassan case para 104.  
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Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon 
it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.143 
 
There is ongoing debate as to how broadly such implied powers are to be interpreted. 
This issue turns on whether the powers in question are to be implied from the functions 
and objectives of the organization, or, more narrowly, from an express provision in the 
relevant treaty.144 Akande submits that in order for the implied power to be deemed 
essential, the ICJ has generally taken the position that “the power to be implied would 
enable the Organization to function to its full capacity as expressed in its objects and 
purposes; in other words that the implied power would promote the efficiency of the 
Organization”145 The European Court’s implied powers can be inferred from the more 
narrow formulation, in that it is implied in the Court’s power to hear individual 
applications in terms of article 34 of the European Convention.  
 
If the power to have recourse to IHL is essential to the performance of the European 
Court’s mandate as a Court of human rights, the same holds true of the African Court. 
As with the European Court, even a narrow approach to implied powers will allow for 
the African Court to be guided by IHL in applying the treaties within its subject-matter 
jurisdiction, as these powers can be implied from articles 3 and 7 of the Court Protocol. 
Thus, the Court’s competence to interpret IHL, and norms belonging to other areas of 
international law, emanates both from articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, as well as, the 
Court’s implied powers. However, these are not alternative arguments, instead, the 
Court’s implied interpretive competence lends further credence to the teleological 
interpretation that articles 60 and 61 of the Charter applies to the Court, advocated for 
above. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
143 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (11 April 
1949) (1949) ICJ Reports 174 at 182.  
144 J Klabbers An introduction to international institutional law, 3rd ed, (2015) 56-62. 
145 D Akande ‘The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 437 444. 
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The purpose of this article is to explore the status of IHL with respect to the mandate 
of the African Court, and particularly the extent to which the Court is empowered to 
directly apply IHL, on the one hand, and rely on IHL as an interpretive aid in applying 
human rights norms, on the other. Should all of IHL fall within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court, the question as to the Court’s interpretive powers in relation 
to IHL would fall away. However, as the above analysis shows, this is not the case. 
While IHL is not altogether excluded from the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the 
number of IHL norms that it can potentially apply directly is very limited. Accordingly, 
in order for the Court to be able to properly fulfil its human rights mandate during 
situations of armed conflict, the need to be able to draw on IHL in the interpretation 
and application of human rights norms remains. To this end, the Court does indeed 
have the competence to do so.  
 
IHL obligations may form part of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in two 
circumstances. First, where IHL obligations have been incorporated in an applicable 
human rights treaty by reference, as is for example the case with the Kampala 
Convention. Secondly, should the Court regard the object and purpose of specific IHL 
treaties as including the achievement of human rights, which is likely, and the primary 
rules of the relevant IHL obligations entail an individual right (which is rather 
uncommon). However, where IHL obligations become justiciable before the Court as 
a result of incorporation by reference, it is not required that the primary rules of the 
relevant IHL obligation entail individual rights. This is so because the relevant IHL 
provisions are incorporated into a human rights treaty, as if though they appear as 
rights in that human rights treaty. The fact that the norm entails an individual right 
comes as a consequence of the norm forming part of a human rights treaty.  
 
Contrary to the majority view, I have concluded that the Court Protocol does not 
contain an interpretation clause. Nevertheless, the Court is empowered to rely on IHL 
in its interpretation and application of human rights norms. This power can be traced 
to two sources. First, on the basis of teleological interpretation, informed by the 
complimentary relationship the Court enjoys with the Commission, the African 
Charter’s interpretation clause applies also to the Court. Secondly, the Court has 
implied powers to use IHL as an interpretive aid. Practically, the Court may be guided 
by the African Charter’s interpretation clause in devising its interpretive strategy under 
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its implied powers. This would result in the Court adopting a consistent approach. 
However, there is a caveat. The Court should take proper account of jurisprudential 
developments within the relevant treaty framework that it is applying. For example, 
should the Court apply the ICCPR it should, to the extent possible, guard against 
reaching conclusions inconsistent with the relevant jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee. Not doing so would run the risk of enhancing institutional fragmentation, 
and thus negate legal certainty as to the human rights obligations of member states.      
 
  
